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PROFIT VS. SUSTAINABILITY 
HOW TO PURSUE A SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT 
 
It seems that nowadays the debate on fragmentation of international law is not yet 
ready to reach a prompt solution. On the contrary, every and each occasion, even at 
the jurisprudential level, seems a good one to offer some new reflections, in brief 
or at length, on the reason why international law results fragmented within itself 
and, in parallel, on the instruments suitable to solve that phenomenon.  
 
True the above, we deem, on the contrary, that reference to fragmentation should 
be avoided, given that the so labeled phenomenon should instead be referred with 
other concepts such as that of expansion of international law. Today we are indeed 
witnessing the raise of many different sub-systems of law, almost one for each 
subject, which “ask” for it. This mean that next or below international law of 
general character there is a multitude of sub-system, formed by norms of special 
character. As such, they reflect the blooming of new needs, deserving a normative 
qualification, in term of rights and obligations. From this, it derives the raise of 
conflicts among norms (and values empowered by them), of general and special 
character, or of norms coming from different sub-systems.  
In this respect, our assumption is that sub-systems of law are not completely 
autonomous nor from each other nor from that of general international law (in 
which, in case of failure, all fall back). This interconnection seems to make useless 
any search for the prevalence of a norm over the other; contrarily, it renders strong 
the need to find a way to integrate and balance among provisions which, while 
pursuing opposite aim, result contemporarily binding and applicable to a given 
situation.  
 
This scenario seems to be well mirrored by the on-going struggle involving norms 
coming from two sub-systems of law apparently pursuing conflicting interest.  
Namely, reference is made to international (and European) investment law and the 
group of norms empowering the principle of sustainable development (that concept 
appeared for the very first time in 1967, to later becoming a principle of 
international law endorsed in binding, or non-binding, normative provisions).  
At first sight, the two groups of norms protect opposite interests: investment law 
has, indeed, been framed in order to guarantee investors’(economic) rights, thus 
allowing them to pursue their activity in the most profitable way. The second group 
of norms aim, instead, to drive economic activity in a sustainable way, thus in 
respect of all fundamental and social rights involved (such as environment, labor 
rights, public health). 
According to the praxis, host State - especially when developing country - has 
accepted foreign investment at almost any condition, so to increase investment flow 
within it-self and boost its economy. Accordingly, host State has never asked 
foreign investor for any special behavior nor it has imposed upon him obligations 
to contribute to its development. By and large, this has meant investment only with 
long lasting protection and economic guarantee. Consequently, host State has for 
long time refused to higher its standard of protection of fundamental right, so to 
align them to the international ones.  
 
Such an imbalanced relation has been for decades legitimized at the normative level 
(multilateral and bilateral agreements) and well mirrored by arbitral decision, which 
have always avoided any chance to reason on (alleged) violation perpetrated by 
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investors against host State’development. It is enough to remember that, the attempt 
made in Salini (¶57) case law was not pursued by further jurisprudential praxis.  
Despite this, it seems that, in the last decade, a wide spread consensus has evolved 
on the need to guarantee sustainable development. 
 
The question of this contribution is therefore, whether and how it is possible to 
pursue a sustainable investment. 
A first attempt to remodeled the relation investment law-sustainable development, 
date back to 2008 when Prof. J. Ruggie, by that time UN SG’Special Representative 
on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other business 
enterprises, law made a public statement related to the introduction of sustainable 
development within investment law as a binding concept (§ 12 Protect, Respect, 
Remedy).  
 
Since then, States have started various tools to integrate SD concerns within FDI 
sources of law. The relative new born principle on sustainable development has 
thus started to be empowered also by international investment law, so to render it a 
binding obligation. 
This change seems to have been driven at both political and normative level, where 
obligations have started to be imposed also on foreign investors, namely if juridical 
persons (small, medium or multinational enterprises).  
To prove this, an excursus through the most recent normative and arbitral praxis is 
required.  
 
As regard the normative level, it seems on-going a deep reshape of investment 
treaties (BITs and IIAs) which, for themselves, are not necessarily treacherous legal 
products. In fact, as any other treaties, they are simply instruments at the disposal 
of contracting parties to legally protect their respective interests. What really 
matters is their content, which obviously depends on agendas, choices and 
concessions of the parties. Consequently, investment agreements have started to 
change nature, including several innovative provisions able to recalibrate the legal 
protection of all stakeholders’ interests ( host State along foreign investors ). This 
step forward can be expected to enhance the chances for economically, socially and 
environmentally sustainable investments. 
A clear, and virtuous example, comes from the Morocco and Nigeria BIT, 
which has increased host State’s right to regulate and it has imposed obligation of 
conduct upon foreign investors. Namely, host State provisions, enacted to pursue a 
S.D. goal, are legitimate; conversely, foreign investors have to pursue their activity 
contributing to host State’ sustainable development.  
Sustainable Development’ goals are thus not anymore declaration of principle 
embedded in preambles (thus serving as mere interpretative tools), but they are 
becoming legally binding provision included right in the text, along with all other 
clauses on rights and obligations. Parties to the above-mentioned BIT have shown 
confidence that such an instrument can offer investors solid protection, without 
compromising on host State’s rights or on social values.  
In parallel, also the European Union seems to have endorsed a more 
sustainable oriented approach, at both the internal and external level (after all, art. 
2.5 and art. 21 TFEU oblige the EU to pursue its foreign relation respecting also… 
sustainable development).  
As regard the internal level, the European Court of justice, in its Opinion 2/15, 
found that that the EU has exclusive competence to enter any international 
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agreement including commitments on all aspects of intellectual property and also 
those concerning sustainable development and environmental protection: all are 
indeed sufficiently linked to the objective of freeing trade. 
At the international level, EU is assuming a leading role in “the sustainability 
cause”: for instance, it was instrumental in shaping Agenda 2030 and, along 
with member States, it is fully committed to implementing it and its Sustainable 
Development Goals into EU policies. This has certainly induced EU negotiator to 
include provision on SD’ goals in the most recent treaties.  
 
As regard jurisprudential level, it seems that arbitrators have started to allow 
Respondent-host State’ counterclaims raised versus Claimant-foreign investor for 
its alleged violation of fundamental rights (Blusun v. Argentina). Besides, it seems 
spreading the practice to start proceeding against corporations which have allegedly 
acted, infringing fundamental rights.  
 
Given the above, two last doubt raises. 
The first regards the allocation of responsibility: who respond for infringement of 
a SD’obligation? Our tenet is that the same fact could potentially raise joint and 
several responsibilities of both host State and foreign investor. 
Investor responds where international agreement, or contracts, binding the parties 
involved, include specific obligations on SD. Host State is responsible where it has 
bound it-self with international treaties (Basel Convention, 1989, Kyoto protocol, 
1997; Paris Agreement, 2016) or other instruments (Protocol of finance and 
investment binding States parties to South African Development Community and 
requiring them to pursue their investment relations according to SD principle) 
providing for obligations on SD. 
The second doubt is strictly related to the first one: if host State can be held 
responsible for infringement of a SD provision, any action pursued to align itself to 
that latter (or other international standard), should not engage State responsibility 
(in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, Respondent State casted doubt upon whether 
"ecological necessity" or "ecological risk" could […] constitute a circumstance 
precluding the wrongfulness of an act). Some have qualified that circumstance as 
State of necessity, but this seems of limited practical application. It should, instead, 
be viewed as exercise of sovereign power in the public interest. Given this, and 
provided that the measure adopted is necessary to the aim pursued, the act is 
legitimate and the compensation due should be defined according to proportionality 
test, as endorsed by the ECtHR.  
 
To conclude, it seems that at both normative and jurisprudential level there is a 
widespread consensus aimed at legitimizing a more balanced investment relation, 
leading to a sustainable investment. 
The better avenue for a State seeking to further its SD’ goal, is to harmonize them 
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